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Abstract 
A central assumption in health utility measurement is that preferences are invariant to 
the elicitation method that is used. This assumption is challenged by preference 
reversals. Previous studies have observed preference reversals between choice and 
matching tasks and between choice and ranking tasks. We present a new preference 
reversal that is entirely choice-based. Because choice is the basic primitive of 
economics and utility theory, this preference reversal is more fundamental and 
troubling. The preference reversal was observed in two studies regarding health states 
after stroke. Both studies involved large representative samples from the Spanish 
population, interviewed professionally and face-to-face. Possible explanations for the 
preference reversal are the anticipation of disappointment and elation in risky choice 
and the impact of ethical considerations about the value of life.  
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1. Introduction 
A standard assumption in health economics and medical decision making is that 
preferences between options do not depend on the method used to elicit them. This 
assumption was challenged by evidence of preference reversals. Stalmeier, Wakker, and 
Bezembinder (1997) observed a preference reversal in a comparison between a choice 
task and a matching task. Let (10y.,5) denote living for 10 years with  a migraine for 5 
days per week (followed by death). Most of their subjects preferred (10y.,5) to (20y.,5). 
However, when asked to equate these two options with a shorter period in good health, 
they usually asked more healthy life-years for (20y.,5) than for (10y.,5). Stalmeier et al. 
attributed this preference reversal to a proportional heuristic according to which a 
subject takes the number of years in full health as a fixed proportion of the number of 
years with migraine. Hence, the preference reversal can be explained by a difference in 
information processing strategy between the two tasks. 
A different kind of preference reversal was observed by Robinson, Dolan, and 
Williams (1997). They observed health states that were valued as better than death by a 
majority of their subjects in a VAS task but when the same subjects were asked to 
choose between 10 years in these health states and death, many selected death. 
Robinson et al. (1997) suggest that these preferences can to a large extent be explained 
by a neglect of the duration of the health states in the VAS task and by a tendency to put 
death at the bottom of the VAS scale. 
In the general economics literature preference reversals have been observed 
between two types of gambles with comparable expected values: a P-bet offering a high 
probability of winning a relatively small amount of money and a $-bet offering a low 
probability of winning a moderate amount of money (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; 
Lindman, 1971). People generally choose the P-bet over the $-bet but place a higher 
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monetary value on the $-bet than on the P-bet. The opposite reversal, choosing the $-bet 
but placing a higher monetary value on the P-bet is relatively rarely observed. The most 
common explanation for this preference reversal is a choice-matching discrepancy, a 
change of information processing strategy between choice and matching (Tversky, 
Sattath, and Slovic, 1988). In support of the choice-matching discrepancy explanation, 
Bostic, Herrnstein, and Luce (1990) found that systematic preference reversals 
disappeared when monetary values were determined through a series of choices rather 
than through matching.  
Bateman et al. (2006) showed that the above preference reversal could be 
considerably attenuated if the values of the P-bet and of the $-bet were determined 
through a ranking procedure instead of a matching task. Oliver (2006) extended their 
findings. He found preference reversals between options involving different 
distributions of life-expectancy and showed that these could be made less substantial by 
using a ranking procedure. 
This paper will present a new preference reversal that, in contrast with the 
previously observed preference reversals is entirely choice-based and, hence, cannot be 
explained by a choice-matching discrepancy. Because choice is the basic primitive of 
economics and decision theory, the reversal we observe is more fundamental and 
troubling. The study we performed was commissioned by a leading pharmaceutical 
company and aimed to assess the potential benefits of a new medicine for stroke. Hence, 
the reversal we observed is not just an intriguing curiosity with little practical relevance, 
but raises significant problems for health policy and economic decisions involving 
health. The preference reversal was observed in two experiments and in a retest of the 
first experiment. Both experiments used representative samples from the general 
Spanish population and the data from both experiments were collected by professional 
 4
interviewers in personal interview sessions. In the first experiment we observed our 
preference reversal between a choice and a ranking task. The second interview showed 
that it also emerged when both tasks were choice-based. The second experiment also 
intended to test the robustness of the preference reversal by controlling for potential 
distorting factors in the first experiment. In spite of all the care we took to obtain high-
quality data, the preference reversal emerged in both experiments and appeared to be 
robust. 
In what follows, Section 1 briefly reviews some earlier findings on preference 
reversals. Section 2 describes the first experiment and Section 3 its results. Section 4 
describes the second experiment, and Section 5 its results. Section 6 discusses our 
findings and reflects on possible explanations. 
 
2. First Experiment  
Health States and Subjects 
The experiment was part of a study on quality of life after stroke. This study was 
commissioned by Pfizer Ltd. and aimed to examine the potential benefits of a new 
medicine for stroke. Six health states that are common after stroke were selected and 
were described by the Modified Rankin Scale, a psychometric scale frequently used to 
measure quality of life after stroke (Rankin, 1957; Bonita and Beaglehole, 1988). One 
of these health states was immediate death. The health states were printed on cards. The 
health states were identified by a letter, which was printed at the back of the card and 
which was not shown to the subjects. The health states other than immediate death are 
described in Table 1.  
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A random sample of 300 subjects aged over 18 was drawn from adults in the 
Spanish population. The sample was split into two groups of 150 subjects with equal 
divisions according to age, gender, and educational level. 
 
Table 1: The Five Health States Used in the Experiments 
   
 Health state Q 
The patient has symptoms as a result of a health problem; symptoms can include numbness, minor 
problems with movement, or some difficulty with reading or writing. The symptoms do not interfere with the 
patient’s usual activities to any appreciable extent, but they may affect the patient’s enjoyment of aspects of 
his daily life. 
 
Health state R 
As a consequence of the health problem the patient is restricted in participation in a major aspect of life that 
he engaged in previously.  He may be unable to work or look after his children if these were major roles 
before; he may have restricted social and leisure activities; or he may have experienced significant 
disruption of close relationships. He can look after his own affairs (preparing meals, household chores, 
shopping in the neighbourhood, looking after his financial situation…) and can attend to his bodily needs 
(such as washing, going to the toilet, and eating) without problems. 
 
Health state X 
As a consequence of their health problem the patient is unable to live independently. He is unable to travel 
alone or shop without help if he did these things previously; and he is unable to look after himself at home 
for some reason (for example he may not be able to prepare a meal, do household chores, or look after 
money,. …). He can attend to his bodily needs (such as washing, going to the toilet, and eating) without 
problems. 
 
Health state Y 
As a consequence of his health problem the patient needs assistance with some basic activities of daily 
living or needs help from another person with walking. Basic activities of daily living include attending to 
bodily needs such as washing, going to the toilet, and eating. 
 
Health state Z 
As a consequence of the health problem the patient is bedridden, and unable to move from bed without 
assistance. He may be incontinent, and needs someone present all the time to look after him. 
 
   
 
Procedure 
The interviews were conducted by professional interviewers, who had received special 
training for this study. They visited subjects at their home, where a face-to-face 
interview was conducted. The interview was carried out in a single session averaging 50 
minutes. Because we used health outcomes, no real incentives could be used. Subjects 
also received no payment for their participation. The issue of incentives is discussed in 
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Section 6. The instructions of the first experiment, including the instructions for the 
interviewers, are in Appendix A. 
The interview started with a motivation for the study. Subjects were told that the 
health states are common after stroke and that it is important for health policy to know 
people’s perception of these health states. Each subject had to conduct several tasks, 
two of which are relevant for this paper. First, subjects had to perform an “extended 
ranking” of the health states. They were asked to rank the cards describing the health 
states in descending order of preference. Equal ranks were allowed. To verify the 
ranking of the health states, subjects were then asked to rate the ranked health states on 
a scale that ranged from 0 to 100, where 0 corresponded to the worst imaginable health 
state and 100 to the best imaginable health state. Subjects were asked to rate the health 
states so that the distances between the health states reflected the differences in 
perceived level of severity. During the rating exercise, subjects were allowed to change 
the given ranking of the health states.  
After the extended ranking, subjects were told that there exist two treatments after 
stroke, a high dose treatment and a low dose treatment, see Figure 1. Both treatments 
could either fail or succeed. For both treatments the success outcome was recovery to 
normal health. The failure outcome of the high dose treatment was death. The low dose 
treatment could not lead to death, but if treatment was ineffective the stroke would lead 
to permanent brain damage and, consequently, to one of the health states Q,R,X,Y, or Z. 
Subjects were then shown a card describing one of the health states Q,R,X,Y, or Z and 
were asked to choose between the high dose treatment offering a 75% probability of 
success (i.e. recovery to normal health) and a 25% probability of immediate death and 
the low dose treatment offering a 75% probability of success and a 25% probability of 
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the displayed health state. It was explicitly stated that it was not clear which treatment 
dose was optimal. 
 
Figure 1: Question Format of the Choices Between the Treatments 
 
Both groups of subjects were asked to make three choices between the high dose 
and the low dose treatment. The first group of subjects made one choice in which the 
failure outcome in the low dose treatment was R, one choice in which it was X, and one 
choice in which it was Z. The second group of subjects made one choice in which the 
failure outcome in the low dose treatment was Q, one choice in which it was Y, and a 
third choice, which is not relevant for the present paper.  
 Figure 1 shows the way the choices between the high dose and the low dose 
treatments were presented to subjects. The two treatments were printed next to each 
other so that subjects could easily compare them. The probabilities 75% and 25% are 
large enough not to be ignored. After the choice problem was explained, subjects were 
asked whether they preferred the high dose treatment, the low dose treatment, or 
whether they were indifferent between the two types of treatment. 
As a robustness check of the elicited choices, the interviewer next determined, 
through a series of choices, probabilities p and q such that the subject was indifferent 
between the high dose treatment offering a p% probability of success and a (1−p)% 
probability of immediate death and the low dose treatment offering a q% probability of 
High dose treatment  Low dose treatment  
Success 
Probability  
Probability of 
death 
 Success 
Probability  
Probability of 
displayed state 
 
75% 25%  75% 25%  
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success and a (1−q)% probability of the displayed health state. Throughout this choice-
based elicitation, subjects were allowed to revise earlier answers including the choices 
that are analysed in this paper and the ranking of the health states. Therefore, if a subject 
thought at some later stage during the interview that he had made an error either in the 
ranking and rating of the health states or in the choice between the high dose and the 
low dose treatment, he could correct this error. 
 
Retest 
After the interview, subjects were asked whether they were willing to be 
interviewed again. The aim of this second interview was to test the reliability of the 
data. About 50% of the subjects agreed to be re-interviewed. Fifty of these (twenty-five 
from each group) were chosen at random and re-interviewed 2-3 weeks after the 
original interview. The people who were re-interviewed were offered €12 for their 
participation. Most subjects (thirty-four) declined to be paid for their participation. 
Experimental procedures of the second interview were identical to those of the first 
interview. 
 
3. Results of the First Experiment 
Methods of Analysis 
The extended ranking yielded a preference ordering of the health states relative 
to death. The choice between the high dose and the low dose treatment also yielded a 
preference ordering of the health states relative to death. Because the common outcome 
(normal health) is obvious in the treatment questions, the display favours isolation 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and, hence, cancellation of the common outcome. Then 
a preference of the high dose treatment over the low dose treatment implies that the 
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displayed health state was less preferred than death. Similarly, a preference of the low 
dose treatment over the high dose treatment implies that the displayed health state was 
preferred to death. For each health state we determined whether it was better than, 
equivalent to, or worse than death both according to the extended ranking task and 
according to the choice between the high dose and the low dose treatment. This gave 
nine possible categories, six of which constituted a preference reversal, i.e. a difference 
in preference between the ranking task and the choice between the high dose and the 
low dose treatment.  
 
 
Preference Reversal 
 Table 2 summarizes the results for health states R,X,Y, and Z. Because we 
observed no preference reversals for health state Q (all subjects indicated in both tasks 
that Q was better than death) we do not report the data for Q. The heading “treatment 
questions” refers to the choice between the high dose and the low dose treatment. 
Shaded cells indicate preference reversals. The proportion of preference reversals was 
9.3%, 24%, 43%, and 18% for health states R,X,Y, and Z respectively. The reversals 
were highly asymmetric: they were virtually always such that a health state was ranked 
above death but was considered worse than death in the choice between the high dose 
and the low dose treatment. The asymmetry was strongly significant for all health states 
(p < 0.001 in all cases by a χ2-test that the preference reversals were equally 
distributed).  
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Table 2: Categorization of responses  
2A. Health State R 
Treatment Questions  
Better Equal Worse 
Better 136  12 
Equal   2 Ranking 
Worse    
 
2B. Health State X 
Treatment Questions  
Better Equal Worse 
Better 100  35 
Equal 1   Ranking 
Worse   14 
 
2C. Health State Y 
Treatment Questions  
Better Equal Worse 
Better 52 9 49 
Equal  1 6 Ranking 
Worse 1  32 
 
2D. Health State Z 
Treatment Questions  
Better Equal Worse 
Better 20  21 
Equal 1  5 Ranking 
Worse   103 
 
For health states X, Y, and, Z the probability of displaying a preference reversal 
was not related to age, gender or employment status. For health states X, Y, Z there was 
neither an effect of level of education. For health state R, having at least elementary 
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education significantly (p=0.02) reduced the possibility of displaying a preference 
reversal. There was no additional effect from having more than elementary education.  
 
 Results of the Retest 
 For all 50 subjects in the retest the ranking of the health states was identical to 
the ranking given in the first interview. The proportion of preference reversals was 0%, 
16%, 28%, and 40% for health states R,X,Y, and Z, respectively. The reversals were, as 
before, highly asymmetric (p < 0.001) and such that the valuation of a health state 
relative to death was lower in the choice between the low dose and the high dose 
treatment. The pattern was therefore similar to that observed in the first experiment.  
 
Table 3: Results of the Retest 
 
Health State 
Pattern 
R 
 
X Y Z 
C1Cr 25 16 12 15 
C1PRr 0 2 2 7 
PR1Cr 0 5 6 0 
PR1PRr 0 2 5 3 
 
 
 Table 3 addresses the question whether subjects who exhibited a preference 
reversal in the first interview did so as well in the retest. C1Cr denotes consistency in 
both the first experiment and the retest, C1PRr denotes consistency in the first interview, 
but a preference reversal in the retest, etc. Overall, about 50% of the subjects who 
exhibited a preference reversal in the first interview also exhibited a preference reversal 
in the retest. For health state R, there were no subjects in the retest who exhibited a 
preference reversal in the first interview. For health states X,Y, and Z,  28%, 45%, and 
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100%, respectively, of the subjects who exhibited a preference reversal in the first 
interview did so as well in the retest.  
 
4. Second Experiment 
4.1. Background 
 The principal aim of the second experiment was to examine whether the 
preference reversal could be replicated when both tasks were choice-based. Recall that 
the first task of the first experiment was to rank the health states, without ranking being 
related to choice, whereas the second task involved a choice between treatments. Hence, 
it may be that the preference reversal was due to a choice-ranking disparity. Even 
though Bateman et al. (2006) and Oliver (2006) observed less preference reversals in 
choice-ranking tasks, some preference reversals persisted. To rule out the possibility 
that the preference reversal was due to a choice-ranking disparity, in the second 
experiment ranking was derived from choice and, hence, both tasks involved only 
choices.  
A second possibility that we wished to rule out was that the reversal was due to a 
framing effect. In the choice between the two treatments, we had labelled one treatment 
the high dose treatment and the other the low dose treatment. Even though the 
treatments only differed in the outcome that obtained when treatment failed, these labels 
may have led to a framing bias. For example, high dose may have a more positive 
connotation, even though the instructions clearly stated that there was no optimal dose, 
leading some subjects to simply choose based on the labels. In the second experiment 
we, therefore, used the neutral labels treatment 1 and treatment 2 and we varied which 
treatment was treatment 1 and which was treatment 2. 
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A third aim of the second experiment was to examine whether the preference 
reversal might have been caused by the inclusion of the rating task in the extended 
ranking. Robinson et al. (1997), who observed a reversal that bears some resemblance 
to the reversal we observed, found that in a rating task, where subjects were told 
beforehand that all states lasted for 10 years and were followed by death, most subjects 
valued all health states as better than death, even very poor health states. When directly 
asked to choose between 10 years in such a poor health state (followed by death) and 
immediate death, many subjects preferred immediate death. Robinson et al. presented 
evidence that these preferences occurred because in the rating task people tended to put 
death at the bottom of scale and ignored the duration of the health states. The tendency 
to put death at the bottom of the scale was much weaker in our first experiment than in 
Robinson et al.1, but it may nevertheless have reinforced the preference reversal. We, 
therefore, omitted the rating task in the second experiment. In addition, in case people 
also had a tendency to rank death as the worst state, we explicitly mentioned in the 
ranking task that it may well be that some health states are considered so bad that living 
in them for the rest of your life is worse than immediate death. It is unlikely that 
duration neglect can explain the reversal we observed, because the emphasis on the 
duration of the health states was similar in the extended ranking and in the choice 
between the treatments. Nevertheless, in the second experiment we emphasized at 
several places in the ranking task that all health states would last for the rest of subjects’ 
lives. 
  
                                                 
1 Of the subjects who exhibited a preference reversal, 28% put death at the bottom of the scale for health 
state R, 25% for health state X, and 40% for health state Y. All subjects exhibiting a preference reversal 
for Z put death at the bottom of the scale, which is not surprising given that Z is a very poor health state. 
By comparison, in the Robinson et al. study, 66% of the subjects displaying a preference reversal put 
death at the bottom of the scale.  
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4.2. Method 
 
Subjects 
 Subjects in the second experiment were a random sample of 100 members aged 
over 18 from the general Spanish population. The sample characteristics were similar to 
those of the first experiment except that the educational level of the second sample was 
higher.  
 
Procedure 
 The procedure of the second experiment was the same as that of the first 
experiment except for the following. We did not split the sample and all subjects 
answered the same questions. Subjects had to perform fewer tasks in the second 
experiment and, hence, the duration of the interviews was less than in the first 
experiment, on average 30 minutes. The instructions of the second experiment, to the 
extent that they differ from those in the first experiment, are in Appendix B. 
 As mentioned above, in the first task ranking was derived from choice. Subjects 
were shown cards with 7 health states, which they were told are common after stroke. 
These health states were the five health states of the first experiment and normal health 
and death. Subjects were then told to imagine that they had had a stroke and we asked 
them in which of the 7 states they would prefer to be. After subjects had chosen this 
state we removed the card of this health state and asked them to choose between the 
remaining 6 health states. We continued this process until only one card remained. The 
first task, to which we will refer henceforth as choice-based ranking, was close to 
ranking, but involved choices and hence was entirely based on revealed preference. The 
reason we included normal health among the health states was to make the first choice 
easy and to test whether subjects understood the procedure. Indeed, all subjects chose 
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normal health in the first choice. As mentioned above, we did not ask subjects to rate 
the health states on a 0-100 scale in the second experiment.  
 After the choice-based ranking task, subjects had to make five choices between 
risky treatments. The treatments were as in the first experiment: one offered a 75% 
probability of normal health and a 25% probability of death, the other offered a 75% 
probability of normal health and a 25% probability of one of the health states Q,R,X,Y, 
or Z. Hence, in the second experiment subjects made the choices between the treatments 
for all five health states. As mentioned before, the treatments were anonymously 
labelled treatment 1 and treatment 2 and which treatment was 1 and which was 2 varied 
across subjects. Except for the labelling, the display of the choices was as in Figure 1. 
Contrary to the first experiment, we did not proceed to determine the probabilities for 
which subjects were indifferent between the two treatments after a choice was made. 
We also did not do a retest of the second experiment. 
 
Standard Gamble Questions 
We added a new risky choice in the second experiment in which only one of the 
treatments involved risk. Such standard gamble questions in which a riskless option is 
compared with a risky option are widely used in health utility measurement. As we will 
explain later, the standard gamble questions also led to a preference ordering of the 
health states relative to death. We included the standard gamble questions to further test 
the robustness of the preference reversal and to test whether theories of the gambling 
effect that have been proposed in decision under risk (Fishburn, 1980; Schmidt, 1998; 
Luce and Marley, 2000; Diecidue, Schmidt, and Wakker, 2004) could explain the 
preference reversal. As we show in Appendix C, these theories can explain the 
 16
preference reversal we observed in the first experiment, but they cannot explain any 
reversals between the ranking task and the standard gamble questions.  
 For each of the health states Q,R,X,Y, and Z, subjects were asked to make a  
choice between that health state for sure and a treatment offering a 5% of normal health 
and a 95% probability of death. If a subject chose the treatment then we asked him to 
choose between the health state for sure and a treatment offering a 0.1% of normal 
health and a 99.9% probability of death.  
 
 5. Results of the Second Experiment 
Methods of Analysis 
 The choice-based ranking yielded a preference relative to death for each health 
state. As in the first experiment, we could also derive the preference of each health state 
relative to death from the choice between the two risky treatments. In the standard 
gamble questions, a preference for a health state relative to death was derived as 
follows. If a subject preferred the health state for sure in at least one of the two standard 
gamble questions then the health state was preferred to death. If the subject preferred 
the treatment in both questions then death was at least as preferred as the health state. 
Strictly speaking, it was possible that a subject would choose the health state for sure 
for a probability of success less than 0.1%. This preference would be very weak, 
however, and our inference about preference could be assumed to hold in close 
approximation. 
 
Preference Reversal 
 Table 4 presents the results from the second experiment. We do not report the 
data for health state Q because in all three tasks all subjects preferred Q to death and, 
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hence, we observed no preference reversals for Q. The first two rows of Table 4 give 
information on the preference reversal between choice-based ranking and the choice 
between the two risky treatments. The row Choice > Death > Treatments shows for each 
health state the proportion of subjects who preferred the health state to death in the 
choice-based ranking, but preferred death to the health state in the choice between the 
two treatments. The row Treatments > Death> Choice shows for each health state the 
proportion of subjects who preferred the health state to death in the choice between the 
two risky treatments, but preferred death to the health state in the choice-based ranking.  
 
Table 4: Proportion of Preference Reversals in the Second Experiment 
 R X Y Z 
Choice > Death > Treatments 10 23 33 22 
Treatments > Death > Choice 2 0 0 4 
Choice > Death > SG 2 24 42 23 
SG > Death > Choice 0 0 0 2 
Treatments > Death > SG 2 7 13 3 
SG > Death > Treatments 8 6 4 0 
 
Table 3 clearly shows that in spite of the changes in the experimental design the 
preference reversal that we observed in the first experiment re-emerges. The proportion 
of reversals was comparable to that in the first experiment. Again, the reversals were 
highly asymmetric. The asymmetry was significant (p = 0.039 for health state R, p < 
0.001 for all other health states). Of the subjects who exhibited a preference reversal, 
the proportion who put death at the bottom of the scale was lower than in the first 
experiment (20% for states R and Y and 22% for X). 
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Standard Gamble Questions 
Table 3 also shows that a similar preference reversal was observed when we 
compared the choice-based ranking with the standard gamble questions. Except for 
health state R, we observed a considerable amount of preference reversals for all health 
states and there was a pronounced asymmetry in the observed preference reversals: they 
were nearly always such that the health state was preferred to death in the choice-based 
ranking but death was preferred to the health state in the standard gamble questions. The 
asymmetry was significant for health states X, Y, and, Z (p < 0.001 in all cases). 
 The final two rows of Table 3 show that the choices between the risky 
treatments and the standard gamble questions were generally consistent. Preference 
reversals between the choices between the risky treatments and the standard gamble 
questions were much less common and, what is more, there appeared to be no clear 
asymmetry in the preference reversals. Only for health state Y was the asymmetry in the 
number of preference reversals significant (p = 0.049). For all health states and for all 
three comparisons, the probability of displaying a preference reversal was not related to 
age, gender, educational status, or employment status. 
 
6. Discussion 
Main findings 
 Several studies have observed that preferences can reverse across different tasks. 
The common explanation for these reversals is a choice-matching discrepancy: people’s 
information processing strategy changes across tasks. In this study we observed a new 
type of preference reversal that cannot be explained by a choice-matching discrepancy. 
In the first experiment the reversal occurred between a ranking and a choice task, but 
 19
the second experiment in which the ranking was made choice-based and, hence, only 
choices were used, showed that a difference in response modes cannot explain the 
findings. The reversal is more troubling for economics because, at least in the second 
experiment, it is completely within the revealed preference paradigm. The implications 
of the observed preference reversal for economic applications in the health domain are 
clearly worrying: our findings suggest that the assumption that people have an invariant 
preference relation over health outcomes may be untenable. 
 
Possible Objections 
 It seems unlikely that the reversal we observed was entirely due to response 
error. First, the preference reversal was highly asymmetric and this asymmetry was not 
a consequence of the fact that in one of the tasks either all subjects considered a health 
state as better than death or all subjects considered a health state as worse than death. 
Second, we used personal interviews to obtain high-quality data. Third, as noted in 
section 2, in the first experiment the ranking was followed by a rating task and the 
choices between the two treatments were followed by a series of choice questions to 
determine probabilities for which subjects considered the treatments equivalent. If 
subjects had made an error they were likely to discover this during these additional 
tasks and correct their earlier response. Fourth, for health state Q we observed no 
preference reversals. Finally, a sizeable proportion of the subjects who had displayed a 
reversal during the interview did so as well in the retest of the first experiment. 
It might be argued that the preference reversal we observed is merely a violation 
of the independence axiom, which says that if prospect P is preferred to prospect Q then 
for any prospect R and 0 < λ < 1, the mixed prospect λP + (1−λ)R is preferred to λQ + 
(1−λ)R. It is well-established that people do not behave according to independence. See, 
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for example Oliver (2003) for evidence in the health domain. We do not concur with the 
view that our preference reversal is caused by a violation of independence and believe 
that observed preference reversal is more fundamental. In the violations of the 
independence axiom that have been observed in the literature, the common outcome is 
typically a risky prospect and it is difficult to see that this prospect is common to both 
choice options. In contrast, in our study, the common outcome was riskless and the 
display of the choices was such that it was clear that this outcome was common. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) isolation effect then predicts that this common 
outcome is cancelled and that people’s choices are determined by the outcome that is 
not common. 
An interesting by-product of our study is that our findings suggest that the 
introduction of financial compensation might do more harm than good in health 
valuation experiments. In the retest of the first experiment we offered subjects financial 
compensation for their participation, but most of them declined. Apparently, people 
have an intrinsic motivation to participate in health valuation experiments because they 
feel that they are contributing to society. Offering financial compensation might 
negatively affect (“crowd out”) this intrinsic motivation. Similar examples of crowding-
out effects include Titmuss (1970) and Upton (1973), who found that people’s 
willingness to donate blood decreased after they were offered financial compensation, 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998), who found that government subsidies reduced private 
donations and charitable funds, and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), who found that 
pupils collecting donation for charity performed worse when given moderate rather than 
no payment. 
A difference between the tasks involved in our experiment was that the choice 
between the treatments (and also the standard gamble questions) involved only two 
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health states and death, whereas in the ranking the initial choice set consisted of 5 health 
states and death in the first experiment and 6 health states and death in the second 
experiment. Empirical evidence suggests that the presence of other alternatives in the 
choice set may affect the evaluation of alternatives relative to each other (Tversky and 
Simonson, 1993; Wedell, 1991). Such context effects are unlikely to have caused the 
preference reversal we observed. Recall that we observed the preference reversal for the 
three least attractive health states. If we make the plausible assumption that death is 
perceptually different from the other health states then the empirical evidence on 
context effects suggests that the presence of more attractive health states in the choice 
set would have the effect of making the less attractive health states less appealing 
compared to death. Hence, context effects predict that if preference reversals exist they 
are such that the health state is preferred to death in the choice between the treatments 
but less preferred to death in the ranking. This is the opposite of what we observed. 
Hence, if context effects were present they only attenuated the preference reversal we 
observed; without them the preference reversal would be even more pronounced. 
 
Explanations 
 The reversal we observed can be interpreted as a violation of elementary 
stochastic dominance, in the sense that if a health state is preferred to death then one of 
the treatments yields for each state of nature an outcome that is at least as good as the 
other treatment, but nevertheless it is less preferred than the dominated treatment. Such 
violations of elementary stochastic dominance have not been observed for monetary 
outcomes (Starmer, 2000). Our study is therefore the first to find systematic evidence of 
such choice-based violations of elementary stochastic dominance. 
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Several theories allow for violations of stochastic dominance, like subjectively 
weighted utility (Handa, 1977; Fishburn, 1978) and prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), but none of these theories can explain the violations of elementary 
stochastic dominance that we observed. Because we observed in the second experiment 
that a preference reversal also arose in the comparison between the choice-based 
ranking and the standard gamble questions, the gambling effect models do not offer a 
satisfactory explanation for the preference reversal either (see Appendix C). 
Our reversal somewhat resembles a preference reversal that was observed by 
Birnbaum et al. (1992) (see also Birnbaum and Sutton, 1992; Mellers, Weiss, and 
Birnbaum, 1992). They found that a majority of their subjects placed a larger monetary 
value on the gamble giving a 95% chance of $96 and a 5% chance of $0 than on the 
gamble giving a 95% chance of $96 and a 5% chance of $24. Dominance implies that 
people will choose the second gamble over the first gamble and a preference reversal 
results. A dual finding was reported by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987), who found that 
replacing zero by a negative outcome increased the valuation of a gamble. Birnbaum et 
al. (1992) showed that configural weight theory (Birnbaum, 1974; Birnbaum et al., 
1992) can explain their reversal. Configural weight theory can also explain our findings 
if we make the restrictive assumption that subjects give more weight to the outcome of 
successful treatment when death is the outcome of treatment failure. It is questionable 
whether this assumption holds. Death is not a neutral outcome, like receiving nothing in 
a monetary gamble, and several studies have found that the possibility of death makes 
people extremely risk averse (Lundberg et al., 1999; Lenert, Sherbourne, and Reyna, 
2001). 
 A possible explanation for our findings can be the anticipation of disappointment 
and elation in risky choice (Loomes and Sugden, 1986). In the comparison between the 
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two risky treatments subjects may have anticipated feelings of disappointment when the 
treatment that offered normal health with 75% probability and a worse health state with 
probability 25% failed. In case the treatment involving a 25% risk of death failed such 
feelings of disappointment play no role because the subject would be dead anyway. The 
presence of disappointment in the evaluation of one treatment but not in the other may 
have caused the reversal of preference between the ranking and the risky treatments. In 
the standard gamble questions subjects may have anticipated feelings of elation when 
the treatment, in spite of its poor prospects, would be successful. This anticipation of 
elation may have explained that some health states, which were considered better than 
death in the ranking, were nevertheless less attractive than a treatment offering only a 
0.1% of success. 
 There is another, ethical, explanation for our findings. It may be that in the 
ranking task, the choice between a bad health state and death raised ethical problems 
that disappear when risk was introduced. In the ranking, the choice of death could be 
related to such issues as euthanasia or the value of life per se. When risk is introduced 
such ethical concerns are less prominent, because the choice of a treatment involving a 
risk of death cannot be so easily related to the same ethical considerations. Frey, 
Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996) showed how moral considerations can 
counterbalance market forces. Our findings may be interpreted as providing additional 
evidence for the importance of moral considerations in decision making. 
 
Implications 
 The reversal we observed is probably caused by the special role of death 
compared to other health states. That does not restrict the importance of our reversal, 
however. Many decisions involve a probability of death, e.g. life-cycle consumption 
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choices and many insurance decisions. Our findings suggest that there exists no stable 
preference relation of health states relative to death and that the common assumption 
that a utility of health exists may be untenable. This is clearly worrying for economic 
evaluations of health care: the cost-effectiveness ratio of treatments and, hence, the 
decision which treatments to reimburse, can vary with the method used to elicit 
preferences. Also, decisions on whether or not to prolong treatment for severely ill 
patients may depend on the method used to elicit preferences. As the costs of treating 
terminally ill patients take up the main part of the health budget in developed countries, 
such decisions clearly have important societal repercussions.  
Unfortunately, it is not clear how to solve the problem indicated by our findings. 
In the second experiment, we based both tasks on revealed preference and tried to 
correct for several biased that we thought might have been responsible for the reversal 
in the first experiment. The reversal turned out to be robust, however. Hence, we see no 
reasons to believe that one of the tasks was superior to the other and in the absence of a 
gold standard for eliciting preferences, solving the dilemma is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. To solve the dilemma, future research may have to look deeper into the 
reasons behind people’s choices. For example, if the ethical explanation we suggested 
above underlies the preference reversal then the answer which method to use to elicit 
preferences in economic evaluations of health care depends on whether or not these 
ethical considerations are to be included in health policy. 
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Appendix A: Instructions in the First Experiment. Interviewer Instructions are in 
Italics and Between [...]. 
This survey is part of a study conducted under the supervision of Pompeu Fabra 
University. The objective of the study is to know people´s point of view about different 
health problems. We are going to ask you hypothetical situations, that is, that you do not 
face in practice but it would be of much help if you could tell us what you would do in 
these situations. Take into account that there are no right or wrong answers. We just 
want to know your opinion. Please, ask any question that you may have during the 
interview. Thanks. 
 
Stroke is a health problem caused by the placement of blood clots in the brain. Health  
after stroke can vary widely between patients. I am going to describe 6 possible health 
states after stroke. I am going to ask you to consider also death as a potential 
consequence of stroke. I would like to know how good or bad these health states are for 
you. Please rank the six cards from the most to the least preferred. 
 
[ Instruction for the interviewer: give the subject the six cards that describe the health 
states including the one with death. Cards are identified with a letter at the back. Let 
the subject read the cards. Wait until the subject ends with the ranking and then read 
the next sentence.] 
 
In order to help you to express your opinion about how good or bad the 6 health states 
are we use a scale similar to a thermometer. In this thermometer 100 is the number 
associated to the best health state you can imagine. 0 is the worst health state you can 
imagine. We would like you to place on the scale each of the 6 health states taking into 
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account that when comparing two health states, the more preferred has to receive a 
higher number than the less preferred and the distance has to show how much better or 
worse it is. 
 
Treatment questions 
When somebody has a stroke it is very important to provide medication as soon as 
possible to remove the blood clot. Otherwise, there can be permanent injuries in the 
brain that may create important chronic health problems. However, the best treatment 
(or better said the best dose) is not clear. In general, there are two ways of dealing with 
this problem. The doctor can give to the patient two different doses, namely, high or 
low. The problem of the high dose is that in some patients it can lead to death. The low 
dose cannot cause death but in some patients it can be ineffective and then the stroke 
can cause brain damage and the patient will have health problems for the rest of his life. 
We are now going to show you several hypothetical situations and we would like 
you to tell us which dose you prefer. 
 
Appendix B: Instructions in the Second Experiment. Interviewer Instructions are 
in Italics and Between [...]. 
Stroke is a health problem that is produced by a blood clot in your brain. The 
consequences for your health can be quite different. I am going to describe to you 
several situations that you might have after a stroke. 
 
Assume you may have a stroke. Assume that you can remain, for the rest of your life, as 
follows [interviewer, show the cards] 
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If you had had a stroke and you could be as one of those patients, which one would you 
choose to be? 
 
P1. I would choose to be …………… [interviewer, if the subject does not say ‘patient 
N’ there is a mistake. Please, check that the subject has understood the question] 
 
This is right, the ideal thing would be to be patient N, that is, to be totally well after the 
stroke. However, in some occasions this does not happen. Patients will remain, for the 
rest of their life in a health state that is worse than the one they were enjoying before the 
stroke. Now, we ask you to make a choice between the other patients, according to your 
preferences. That is, if you could not be patient N, which patient would you choose to 
be? You will see that in one patient you read “dead”. Indeed, stroke can lead to death. 
Recall that your situation is chronic, that is, it is going to last for the rest of your life. It 
is possible that you think that the health state of some of the patients is so bad that it 
would had been better for you to die rather than living the rest of your life in the 
situation of one of those patients. 
 
P2. If  as a consequence of a stroke I could not be as patient N (normal health), I think I 
would choose to be patient………………… 
 
Please go on with the rest of the patients, by order of preference until the one that you 
think is the worst off. 
 
Standard gamble questions 
Finally, we are going to ask you to assume that you are as one of the above patients as a 
consequence of a stroke, but there is only one treatment available. You have to choose 
whether to accept the treatment or not. The problem is that this treatment is only 
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effective in very few occasions (5% of the cases, i.e. in 5 out of 100 people) and in the 
rest of cases it leads to death. 
Assume that as a consequence of a stroke you are going to be as patient R the 
rest of your life and you are offered the treatment that with probability 5% allows you to 
return to your normal health, the situation you had before the stroke, and with 
probability 95% results in death. 
Do you think that you would follow the treatment or you would accept to remain 
as patient R for the rest of your life? (we do not know what will happen in the future but 
assume that there is not going to be a better treatment available in the future). 
a. I would take the treatment  [interviewer go to next question] 
b. I prefer to stay as R for the rest of my life. 
 
Do you think that you would follow the treatment if you were informed that it 
only worked very rarely, say in 1 out of 1000 people? 
a. I would take the treatment  [interviewer go to next question] 
b. I prefer to stay as R for the rest of my life. 
 
Appendix C: Proof that gambling effect theories can account for the reversal 
between ranking and treatments but not between ranking and standard gamble 
questions 
 According to the theories of the gambling effect, people use different utility 
functions v and u to evaluate outcomes that are riskless and outcomes that are risky, 
respectively. To explain the common deviations from expected utility, these theories 
assume that for all outcomes x, v(x) > u(x). In the extended ranking all outcomes are 
riskless and the function v is applied. In the choices between the treatments, all 
outcomes are risky and u is applied. If v and u do not order outcomes identically, i.e. 
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there exist health states h such that v(h) > v(death), but u(death) > u(h) then the 
gambling effect theories can explain the preference reversal between the extended 
ranking and the choices between the risky treatments. A choice for the risky treatmnet 
in the standard gamble questions implies, however that pu(normal health) + 
(1−p)u(death) > v(h) as p→0. This contradicts, however, that v(h) > v(death) > u(death). 
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